An Equivalence Result on the Reduction of Games with Unawareness

Yasuo Sasaki ()
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Yasuo Sasaki: School of Knowledge Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 1-1, Nomi, Ishikawa, 923-1292, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2016, vol. 18, issue 03, 1-27

Abstract: Recently models and solution concepts of games with unawareness have been developed. This paper discusses the issue of reducing static games with unawareness to standard Bayesian games and shows that equilibrium concepts for the two formulations, i.e., generalized Nash equilibrium and Bayesian equilibrium, are equivalent. We discuss implications of the result.

Keywords: Unawareness; Bayesian games; generalized Nash equilibrium; Bayesian equilibrium; reduction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198916500092

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