 Intrinsic Comparative Statics of a Nash Bargaining SolutionInternational Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2016, vol. 18, issue 04, 1-11 Abstract: A generalization of the class of bargaining problems examined by Engwerda and Douven [(2008) On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution, Int. J. Game Theory 37, 265–279] is studied. The generalized class consists of nonconvex bargaining problems in which the feasible set satisfies the requirement that the set of weak Pareto-optimal solutions can be described by a smooth function. The intrinsic comparative statics of the aforesaid class are derived and shown to be characterized by a symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix, and an upper bound to the rank of the matrix is established. A corollary to this basic result is that a Nash bargaining solution is intrinsically a locally nondecreasing function of its own disagreement point. Other heretofore unknown results are similarly deduced from the basic result. Keywords: Nash bargaining solution; disagreement point; comparative statics (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:18:y:2016:i:04:n:s0219198916500134 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1142/S0219198916500134 Access Statistics for this article International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. |
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