Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium in Repeated Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

O. V. Baskov
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O. V. Baskov: Saint Petersburg State University, Universitetskiy prospect, 35, Peterhof, Saint Petersburg, 198504, Russian Federation2Higher School of Economics, Kantemirovskaya st., 3, Saint Petersburg, 194100, Russian Federation

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2017, vol. 19, issue 03, 1-8

Abstract: We propose a generalization of the notion of bounded computational capacity equilibrium in repeated zero-sum games played by finite automata. We show that if the players’ mixed strategies are to contain automata of the same size, the equilibrium in our sense does not exist in general, and if the players are allowed to mix automata of different sizes, the equilibrium in our sense always exists.

Keywords: Game theory; repeated games; finite automata; zero-sum games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1142/S021919891750013X

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