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Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values

Takumi Kongo ()
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Takumi Kongo: Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University, 8-19-1 Nanakuma, Jonan-ku, Fukuoka 814-0180, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2018, vol. 20, issue 01, 1-14

Abstract: We provide axiomatic characterizations of the solutions of transferable utility (TU) games on the fixed player set, where at least three players exist. We introduce two axioms on players’ nullification. One axiom requires that the difference between the effect of a player’s nullification on the nullified player and on the others is relatively constant if all but one players are null players. Another axiom requires that a player’s nullification affects equally all of the other players. These two axioms characterize the set of all affine combinations of the equal surplus division and equal division values, together with the two basic axioms of efficiency and null game. By replacing the first axiom on players’ nullification with appropriate monotonicity axioms, we narrow down the solutions to the set of all convex combinations of the two values, or to each of the two values.

Keywords: TU game; axiomatization; equal division value; equal surplus division value; nullification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198917500293

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