Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project

Sébastien Rouillon

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2018, vol. 20, issue 03, 1-24

Abstract: We consider a dynamic contribution game in which a group of agents collaborates to complete a public project. The agents exert efforts over time and get rewarded upon completion of the project, once the cumulative effort has reached a pre-specified level. We explicitly derive the cooperative solution and a noncooperative Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. We characterize the set of socially efficient projects, i.e., projects that cooperative groups find worth completing. Comparing with the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, we find that noncooperative groups give up large socially efficient projects. Moreover, they take too much time to complete the projects that they undertake.

Keywords: Voluntary contribution games; differential games; free-riding; procrastination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project (2018)
Working Paper: Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:20:y:2018:i:03:n:s0219198918400029

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198918400029

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