Substitution, Complementarity, and Stability

Harborne Stuart

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2019, vol. 21, issue 01, 1-15

Abstract: We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a non-empty core in many-to-one assignment games. When players on the “many†side (buyers) are substitutes with respect to any given player on the other side (firms), we show that non-emptiness requires an additional condition that limits the competition among the buyers. When buyers are complements with respect to any given firm, a sufficient condition for non-emptiness is that buyers also be complements with respect to all of the firms, collectively. A necessary condition is that no firm can be guaranteed a profit when the core is non-empty.

Keywords: Cooperative game; matching; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919400061

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