Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria
Gisèle Umbhauer ()
Additional contact information
Gisèle Umbhauer: Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée, University of Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2019, vol. 21, issue 02, 1-40
Abstract:
The paper studies second-price all-pay auctions — wars of attrition — in a new way, based on classroom experiments and Kosfeld et al.’s best-reply matching (BRM) equilibrium. Two players fight over a prize of value V, and submit bids not exceeding a budget M; both pay the lowest bid and the prize goes to the highest bidder. The behavior probability distributions in the classroom experiments are strikingly different from the mixed Nash equilibrium (NE). They fit with BRM and generalized best-reply matching (GBRM), an ordinal logic according to which, if bid A is the best response to bid B, then A is played as often as B. The paper goes into the GBRM logic, highlights the role of focal values and discusses the high or low payoffs this logic can lead to.
Keywords: Second-price all-pay auction; war of attrition; best-reply matching; Nash equilibrium; classroom experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198919400097
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:21:y:2019:i:02:n:s0219198919400097
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919400097
Access Statistics for this article
International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung
More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().