Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness: At 0 Discontinuous Industry Revenue and Decreasing Price Flexibility

Pierre Von Mouche and Takashi Sato ()
Additional contact information
Pierre Von Mouche: Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands
Takashi Sato: Shimonoseki City University, Shimonoseki, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2019, vol. 21, issue 02, 1-19

Abstract: We consider the equilibrium uniqueness problem for a large class of Cournot oligopolies with convex cost functions and a proper price function p̃ with decreasing price flexibility. This class allows for (at 0) discontinuous industry revenue and in particular for p̃(y) = y−α. The paper illustrates in an exemplary way the Selten–Szidarovszky technique based on virtual backward reply functions. An algorithm for the calculation of the unique equilibrium is provided.

Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; decreasing price flexibility; discontinuous payoff functions; equilibrium uniqueness; pseudo-concavity; Selten–Szidarovszky technique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198919400103
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:21:y:2019:i:02:n:s0219198919400103

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919400103

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().