Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

Thomas Weber

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2019, vol. 21, issue 02, 1-19

Abstract: To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,†which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.

Keywords: First-mover advantage; second-mover advantage; partial commitment; subgame perfection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198919400115
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:21:y:2019:i:02:n:s0219198919400115

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919400115

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().