Defensive Plays in Repeated Games

Miguel Aramendia and Quan Wen ()
Additional contact information
Miguel Aramendia: BRiDGE Group, Departmento de Economia Aplicada IV, Universidad del Pais Vasco, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2019, vol. 21, issue 03, 1-9

Abstract: In obtaining the classical folk theorems for repeated games, the players must collectively coordinate their actions, even after someone deviates. In this paper, we explore the impacts of defensive plays on the set of equilibrium payoffs when all players have sufficiently high discount factor. Once some player deviates, everyone else will play the continuation game defensively by refusing to coordinate with the deviator and hence always choose their best responses in all subsequent periods. We show that this line of reasoning can significantly limit what can be supported by equilibrium in certain classes of repeated games. We characterize the set of limiting equilibrium payoffs under defensive plays.

Keywords: Repeated game; folk theorem; stochastic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198918500123
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:21:y:2019:i:03:n:s0219198918500123

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198918500123

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().