Equilibria in the Stackelberg Oligopoly Reflexive Games with Different Marginal Costs of Agents

Mikhail Geraskin ()
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Mikhail Geraskin: Samara National Research University, Moskovskoye Shosse 34, Samara, Russian Federation

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2019, vol. 21, issue 04, 1-22

Abstract: This paper considers the problem of searching for information equilibria in an oligopoly market in the case of Stackelberg leaders. A framework considers the reflexive behavior of three agents, and linear agent’s cost functions with different coefficients (i.e., marginal and fixed costs) are considered. The results of the study are as follows. First, models of the reflexive games for a triopoly that consider a diversity of agents’ reasonings about environmental strategies are developed. Second, formulas for calculating equilibria in the games with three agents for arbitrary reflexion rank are derived.

Keywords: Oligopoly; Stackelberg model; Nash equilibrium; reflexive behavior; reasoning; leader; follower (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919500026

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