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Linear-State Differential Games in Partition Function Form

Simon Hoof ()
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Simon Hoof: Department of Economics, Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2019, vol. 21, issue 04, 1-13

Abstract: We introduce a partition function for n-player linear-state cooperative differential games. The value of a coalition within a given coalition structure is defined as its noncooperative equilibrium payoff of a game played between the coalitions. We also define two core notions, namely, the cautious and the singleton core. If the game is convex, then the cores are nonempty. In order to illustrate the approach, we consider a symmetric game of pollution accumulation.

Keywords: Linear-state differential games; partition function; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919500063

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