Dual-Issue Final-Offer Arbitration: Invariance of Pure Optimal Strategies Under Lp Metrics

Brian R. Powers ()
Additional contact information
Brian R. Powers: Arizona State University, AZ, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2019, vol. 21, issue 04, 1-27

Abstract: We consider a final-offer arbitration problem between two players with two quantitative issues in dispute. We model the problem as a zero-sum game where the arbiter’s opinion is drawn from a bivariate normal distribution and derive the only possible pure strategies regardless of the choice of Lp metric used by the arbiter.

Keywords: Final-offer arbitration; noncooperative game theory; multi-issue; Brams–Merrill (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198919500117
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:21:y:2019:i:04:n:s0219198919500117

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919500117

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().