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Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games

Aradhana Narang and A. J. Shaiju ()
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Aradhana Narang: Department of Mathematics, IIT Madras, Chennai 600036, India
A. J. Shaiju: Department of Mathematics, IIT Madras, Chennai 600036, India

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2020, vol. 22, issue 01, 1-8

Abstract: The concept of a globally strong uninvadable set of profiles is studied for asymmetric evolutionary games. After establishing a general result concerning weak ω-limit points of the replicator dynamics trajectories, we prove that globally strong uninvadable sets are weak attracting.

Keywords: Asymmetric evolutionary games; replicator dynamics; games with continuous strategy space; globally strong uninvadable sets; weak attracting sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919500142

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