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Dynamic Contest Games with Time Delays

Akio Matsumoto and Ferenc Szidarovszky ()
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Akio Matsumoto: Department of Economics, Chuo University, 742-1, Higashi-Nakano, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0393, Japan
Ferenc Szidarovszky: Department of Mathematics, Corvinus University, Budapest, Fövám tér 8, 1093, Hungary

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2020, vol. 22, issue 03, 1-15

Abstract: Dynamic asymmetric contest games are examined under the assumption that the assessed value of the prize by each agent depends on the total effort of all agents, and each agent has only delayed information about the efforts of the competitors. Assuming gradient dynamics with continuous time scales, first the resulting one-delay model is investigated. Then, assuming additional delayed information about the agents’ own efforts, a two-delay model is constructed and analyzed. In both cases, first the characteristic equation is derived in the general case, and then two special cases are considered. First, symmetric agents are assumed and then general duopolies are examined. Conditions are derived for the local stability of the equilibrium including stability thresholds and stability switching curves.

Keywords: Contest games; hyperbolic oligopoly; dynamic systems with time delays; asymptotic behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919500178

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