Dynamic Bargaining and Time-Consistency in Linear-State and Homogeneous Linear-Quadratic Cooperative Differential Games

Jesús Marín-Solano
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Jesús Marín-Solano: Department de Matemà tica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial and BEAT, Universitat, de Barcelona, Barcelona 08034, Spain

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2021, vol. 23, issue 04, 1-24

Abstract: Three different solution concepts are reviewed and computed for linear-state and homogeneous linear-quadratic cooperative differential games with asymmetric players. Discount rates can be nonconstant and/or different. Special attention is paid to the issues of time-consistency, agreeability and subgame-perfectness, both from the viewpoint of sustainability of cooperation and from the credibility of the announced equilibrium strategies.

Keywords: Cooperative differential games; asymmetric players; time-consistency; dynamic bargaining; linear-state games; linear-quadratic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500037

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