The Folk Rule for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems with Multiple Sources

Gustavo Bergantiños, Youngsub Chun, Eunju Lee and Leticia Lorenzo
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Gustavo Bergantiños: Economics, Society and Territory, Universidade de Vigo. 36310, Vigo. Spain
Youngsub Chun: ��Department of Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul 08826, Korea
Eunju Lee: ��Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA 95616, USA
Leticia Lorenzo: Economics, Society and Territory, Universidade de Vigo. 36310, Vigo. Spain
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Gustavo Bergantiños

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2022, vol. 24, issue 01, 1-36

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources. This new setting is an extension of the classical model where there is a single source. We extend several definitions of the folk rule, the most prominent rule in the classical model, to this new context: first as the Shapley value of the irreducible game; second as an obligation rule; third as a partition rule and finally through a cone-wise decomposition. We prove that all the definitions provide the same cost allocation and present two axiomatic characterizations.

Keywords: Minimum cost spanning tree problems; multiple sources; folk rule; axiomatic characterizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Folk Rule for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems with Multiple Sources (2019)
Working Paper: The Folk Rule for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems with Multiple Sources (2019)
Working Paper: The Folk Rule for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems with Multiple Sources (2018)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500079

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