“Entanglement†and the Exploitation of Common Pool Resources: A Quantum Solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Robert Mamada () and Charles Perrings ()
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Robert Mamada: College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Grand Canyon University, Phoenix, AZ 85017, USA
Charles Perrings: School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85281, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2022, vol. 24, issue 01, 1-17

Abstract: The overexploitation of common pool resources is frequently associated with open access regimes in which each resource user operates independently of all other resource users. The outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma. Restricted access regimes of the sort identified by Ostrom and colleagues typically ensure that individual resource users do not operate independently. Taking a quantum approach to the theory of games, we argue that the institutional arrangements involved in common pool resource management imply the “entanglement†of the strategies of resource users. For a very simple case — two firms exploiting a common pool fishery — we show that there exists an “entanglement†mechanism that assures the cooperative outcome.

Keywords: Common pool resources; prisoners dilemma; quantum games; entanglement; dynamic cournot competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500092

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