Privatization Policies by National and Regional Governments

Francisco Martínez-Sánchez ()
Additional contact information
Francisco Martínez-Sánchez: Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos, para la Economía y la Empresa, Universidad de Murcia, 30100 Murcia, Spain
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francisco Martínez-Sánchez

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2022, vol. 24, issue 02, 1-23

Abstract: In order to analyze the privatization policies undertaken by the national and regional governments, I consider a horizontal differentiation model with price competition in which a country consists of two regions of different sizes. I show that public-sector intervention by either the national or regional government is essential for achieving the social optimum. The preferences of consumers and firms about privatization policy are completely opposite: consumers prefer a regional public-sector intervention, while firms prefer a national public-sector intervention. Finally, I find that the preferences of the two regions about market structures are also opposite: the least populated region prefers the private duopoly, while the most populated region prefers a government intervention in the market.

Keywords: Horizontal differentiation; national and regional governments; mixed duopoly; region size; partial privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 L13 L32 L33 R59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198921500110
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
Working Paper: Privatization Policies by National and Regional Governments (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:24:y:2022:i:02:n:s0219198921500110

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500110

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().