Theoretic Model of Adversaries and Media Manipulation: A Two-Period Extension

Kjell Hausken

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2022, vol. 24, issue 03, 1-23

Abstract: Two adversarial actors interact controversially. Early incomplete evidence emerges about which actor is at fault. In period 1 of a two-period game, two media organizations identify ideologically with each of the two actors who are the players exerting manipulation efforts to support the actor they represent. In period 2, the full evidence emerges. Again, the two players exert efforts to support their preferred actor. This paper illustrates the players’ strategic dilemmas for the typical event that actor 1 is considerably at fault based on the early evidence, and much less at fault based on the full evidence. The model assumes that exerting effort in period 1 implies reward or punishment in period 2 depending on whether the full evidence exceeds the early evidence. Twelve parameters in the model are varied individually relative to a benchmark. For example, the players’ efforts are inverse U shaped to an extent in which the actors they identify with are at fault in the two periods. Increasing the evidence ratio intensity causes lower efforts since the players become more unequally matched.

Keywords: Media; game; adversaries; contest; manipulation; spin control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500195

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