Nash Equilibrium Points for Generalized Matrix Game Model with Interval Payoffs

Ajay Kumar Bhurjee and Vinay Yadav ()
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Ajay Kumar Bhurjee: Department of Mathematics (SASL), VIT Bhopal University, Bhopal-Indore Highway, Kothrikalan, Sehore, Madhya Pradesh – 466114, India
Vinay Yadav: Indian Institute of Management Visakhapatnam, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh – 530003, India

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2022, vol. 24, issue 03, 1-14

Abstract: Game theory-based models are widely used to solve multiple competitive problems such as oligopolistic competitions, marketing of new products, promotion of existing products competitions, and election presage. The payoffs of these competitive models have been conventionally considered as deterministic. However, these payoffs have ambiguity due to the uncertainty in the data sets. Interval analysis-based approaches are found to be efficient to tackle such uncertainty in data sets. In these approaches, the payoffs of the game model lie in some closed interval, which are estimated by previous information. The present paper considers a multiple player game model in which payoffs are uncertain and varies in a closed intervals. The necessary and sufficient conditions are explained to discuss the existence of Nash equilibrium point of such game models. Moreover, Nash equilibrium point of the model is obtained by solving a crisp bi-linear optimization problem. The developed methodology is further applied for obtaining the possible optimal strategy to win the parliament election presage problem.

Keywords: Polymatrix games; noncooperative games; Nash equilibria points; interval analysis; bi-linear optimization problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500213

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