The Role of Deception in a Game of ‘Hide and Seek’

Gordon H. McCormick and Guillermo Owen
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Gordon H. McCormick: Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA
Guillermo Owen: ��Department of Mathematics, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2022, vol. 24, issue 03, 1-31

Abstract: This paper introduces the problem of active deception into the literature on search theory. We consider a game of ‘hide and seek’ in which a hider chooses to hide in one of many cells. Our hider also wishes to remain active which runs the risk of signaling his location. The searcher can look in any cell within the hider’s feasible operating environment but must prioritize his search. To do so, he looks for and has the option of following any indicator of the hider’s possible whereabouts. In conducting his search, however, he also risks signaling where he is about to look next. This gives the hider an opportunity to evade. Each player can employ ‘deceptive signals’, at some cost, to improve their respective chances of success. We examine the nature of the tradeoffs involved in deciding whether or not to use deceptive tactics under different assumptions about the nature of the players’ common operating environment.

Keywords: Search theory; game theory; deception (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500086

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