Theory of Cooperative Public Choice Games
Jeanpantz Chen ()
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Jeanpantz Chen: South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, P. R. China
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2023, vol. 25, issue 02, 1-27
Abstract:
This paper establishes an analytical framework for cooperative public choice games. In a cooperative public choice game under unanimity rule, all the players who belong to the only coalition will equally divide the cooperative payoff surplus, the equilibrium public choice is the one which can bring about the maximum cooperative payoff among all the public choices. In a cooperative public choice game under majority rule, compared with other public choices, the public choice with maximum comparative payoff will finally win the required majority of votes because of its greatest capability of attracting the intermediate team. When in a public choice game under majority rule there are more than two public choices which can bring about the maximum comparative payoff to the supporter coalition, the equilibrium choice will be the same one in the same public choice game under unanimity rule.
Keywords: Cooperative public choice game; majority rule; unanimity rule; cooperative payoff; comparative payoff; common payoff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:25:y:2023:i:02:n:s0219198923500081
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198923500081
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