Robustness Against Indirect Invasions in Asymmetric Games with Continuous Strategy Spaces

Aradhana Narang () and A. J. Shaiju ()
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Aradhana Narang: Department of Mathematics, JIIT, Sector-62, Noida 201309, India
A. J. Shaiju: Department of Mathematics, IIT Madras, Chennai 600036, India

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2023, vol. 25, issue 04, 1-16

Abstract: Strategies which are robust against indirect invasions (RAII) have been studied in the literature for symmetric games. In this paper, we introduce the notion of RAII profiles for asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces. For these games, we prove that the set of all indirect neutral mutants of a RAII profile is equivalent to a minimal evolutionarily stable set. Furthermore, globally strong uninvadable profiles are shown to be RAII profiles. We also discuss connections between evolutionarily stable sets and strict equilibrium sets of profiles.

Keywords: Asymmetric evolutionary games; games with continuous strategy spaces; robustness against indirect invasions; evolutionarily stable sets; strict equilibrium set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198923500123

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