EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Allocation of Portfolio Risk and Outside Options: Which is the Best Coalition Structure Value to Solve the Low-Risk Anomaly?

Tobias Hiller ()
Additional contact information
Tobias Hiller: Department of Microeconomics, University Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2024, vol. 26, issue 01, 1-13

Abstract: In this paper, we enhance the application of coalition structure (CS) games to the distribution of portfolio risk across individual assets in a portfolio. In a recent paper, CS games were applied for the first time as a risk measure that takes into account the contributions of individual assets to portfolio risk and contributions to the risk of the stock market as a whole. We enhance this approach by using five values for CS games in a simulation study. In this simulation, it can be shown that using CS games has an even higher potential to solve the so-called low-risk puzzle than shown in previous literature.

Keywords: Low-risk puzzle; portfolio risk; cooperative game theory; CS games; χ value; proportional value; Wiese value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198923500172
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:26:y:2024:i:01:n:s0219198923500172

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198923500172

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:26:y:2024:i:01:n:s0219198923500172