Performance of Presidential Candidates in a Debate: A Game Theory Perspective

P. H. T. Schimit ()
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P. H. T. Schimit: Informatics and Knowledge Management Graduate Program, Universidade Nove de Julho, Rua Vergueiro, 235/249, 01525-000, São Paulo, SP, Brazil

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2024, vol. 26, issue 01, 1-14

Abstract: In the last moments of the highly polarized and contentious 2022 presidential elections campaigns, two final debates took place for the second-round of the election. This paper proposes an analysis of these debates using an iterated game theory perspective, where the debates are sequential decision-making environments, with the candidates’ statements being classified as cooperative or defection. Cooperative actions denote constructive dialogue revolving around governmental plans, whereas defection encompasses negative campaigning tactics, including ad hominem attacks and the spread of misleading information. Through an exhaustive analysis of transcriptions from both debates, the candidates’ strategic moves are extracted and categorized. The findings offer new insights into the role of strategies in shaping electoral outcomes, emphasizing the nuanced interplay of policy discourse and personal character assessments in a politically charged environment. Additionally, the research underscores the profound implications of such strategies on voter perceptions and decisions, offering a new perspective to the existing literature on political communication and electoral game theory.

Keywords: Candidate strategy; election campaigns; iterated games; televised debates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198923500184

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