Selfish Grower Behavior Can Group-optimally Eradicate Plant Diseases Caused by Coinfection

Frank M. Hilker, Lea-Deborah Kolb and Frédéric M. Hamelin ()
Additional contact information
Frank M. Hilker: Institute of Mathematics and Institute of Environmental Systems, Research, Osnabrück University, Barbarastr. 12, D-49076 Osnabrück, Germany
Lea-Deborah Kolb: Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research — UFZ, Department of Biodiversity and People, Permoserstr. 15, D-04318 Leipzig, Germany3Institute of Biodiversity, Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Dornburger Str. 159, D-07743 Jena, Germany4German Centre for Integrative Biodiversity Research (iDiv), Halle–Jena–Leipzig, Puschstr. 4, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany
Frédéric M. Hamelin: Institut Agro, INRAE, IGEPP, Université de Rennes, 35000 Rennes, France

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2024, vol. 26, issue 02, 1-32

Abstract: Game-theoretic behavioral and epidemiological models suggest that it is impossible to eradicate a disease through voluntary control actions when individuals behave according to their own interests. The simple reason is that free-riding behavior, which is best for self-interest, leads to a control coverage on the group level that is insufficient to eradicate the disease. Here we show that, for diseases that are caused by coinfection, self-interest can actually result in the socially optimal outcome of disease eradication. Our result challenges the conventional wisdom that selfish behavior undermines the group interest; it resolves a social dilemma in the absence of any cooperation, institutional arrangements, or social norms. Our model is motivated by coinfecting plant viruses, common among agricultural crops and natural plants, and the behavioral dynamics of growers to adopt protective action (biological or chemical control). The epidemiological scenario, in which the disease is eradicated by self-interest, is characterized by a positive feedback process in which coinfection enhances infectivity. Similar feedback structures exist for a range of typical epidemiological processes that facilitate disease persistence if prevalence is sufficiently large. The underlying mechanism may therefore be applicable to other diseases.

Keywords: Infectious disease; human behavior; mathematical model; epidemiological game; imitation dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198924400061
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:26:y:2024:i:02:n:s0219198924400061

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198924400061

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().