Analysis of Depreciation Methods Based on Cooperative Game Theory — Focusing on the Straight-Line Method

Eiko Arata, Takuhei Shimogawa () and Takehiro Inohara ()
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Eiko Arata: Faculty of Business and Commerce, Keio University, 2-15-45, Mita, Minato-ku, 1088345 Tokyo, Japan
Takuhei Shimogawa: Faculty of Economics, Musashi University, 1-26-1, Toyotama-kami, Nerima-ku, 1768534 Tokyo, Japan
Takehiro Inohara: Institute for Liberal Arts, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1, Ookayama, Meguro-ku, 1528550 Tokyo, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2025, vol. 27, issue 01, 1-23

Abstract: This study develops a model to explain why accounting procedures, also known as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, are “generally accepted†. For this purpose, we focus on depreciation defined as the rational and systematic allocation of the original cost of an asset over the expected useful life of that asset. We investigate what it means to be “rational†using cooperative game theory. We show that cost allocations determined by the straight-line (SL) method, which is conventionally used worldwide, are elements of the core and that the conditions of the core can be rational in practice. Furthermore, we examine the relationship between the SL method and other solution concepts, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus. Our next step is to clarify the characteristics besides the core selection of the SL method, those of other depreciation methods used in practice, and the logical relations between these characteristics.

Keywords: Cooperative game; core; depreciation; nucleolus; Shapley value; straight-line method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198924500130

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