Generalization of Zhou Fixed Point Theorem

Lu Yu ()
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Lu Yu: Universit Paris 1 Panthon-Sorbonne, UMR 8074, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Paris, France

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2025, vol. 27, issue 01, 1-14

Abstract: We give two generalizations of the Zhou fixed point theorem. They weaken the subcompleteness condition of values, and relax the ascending condition of the correspondence. As an application, we derive a generalization of Topkis’ theorem on the existence and order structure of the set of Nash equilibria of supermodular games.

Keywords: Supermodular game; lattice; Nash equilibrium; Tarski’s fixed point theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C62 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198924500142

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