Information Asymmetric Cooperative Public Choice Games

Jeanpantz Chen ()
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Jeanpantz Chen: South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, P. R. China

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2025, vol. 27, issue 01, 1-36

Abstract: This paper introduces information asymmetry, cooperation and payoff compensation mechanism into public choice games, and establishes an analytical frame for information asymmetric cooperative public choice games. This paper examines the coalition formation and the distribution of the cooperative payoff under the equilibrium public choice (if it does exist) in an information asymmetric public choice game under unanimity rule and those in an information asymmetric public choice game under majority rule, respectively. Arrow [1951] and Sen [1970] assumed that there is no cooperation and payoff compensation mechanism in a public choice game, and showed that rational individuals with individual sovereignty could not reach consensus on any public choice. This paper shows that, even in a public choice game of information asymmetry, the cooperation and payoff compensation mechanism may lead to the coalition equilibrium, the achievement of equilibrium public choice, and the distribution equilibrium of cooperative payoff of the coalition which supports the equilibrium public choice, whether the public choice games are under unanimity rule or under majority rule.

Keywords: Information asymmetric cooperative public choice game; majority rule; unanimity rule; cooperative payoff; comparative payoff; common payoff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198924500178

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