A Review of Game Theory in Pandemics, Social Media Rumors, and Disasters

Kjell Hausken, Jonathan W. Welburn () and Jun Zhuang ()
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Jonathan W. Welburn: Pardee RAND Graduate School, 1776 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401, USA
Jun Zhuang: Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, University at Buffalo, North Campus, 317 Bell Hall, Buffalo, NY 14260, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2025, vol. 27, issue 03, 1-31

Abstract: Game theory in pandemics, social media rumors, and disasters, is reviewed. Evolutionary game theory is commonly used to account for the time dimension. Overarchingly, the game-theoretic precautionary principle accounts for threat, uncertainty, action, and command. Players pursue uncertainty thresholds repeatedly, with uncertainty about which game is played, which players participate, strategy sets, payoffs, incomplete information, risk attitudes, and bounded rationality. Pandemics involve games between multiple societal actors, i.e., companies and various sectors of the economy, countries, governments, individuals, etc. Individuals may choose whether to behave riskily or safely, whether to buy vaccines and drugs, mask-wearing, distancing, etc. Companies may produce vaccines and drugs. Policymakers and the international community may free ride on who shall bear the costs. Social media platforms play censorship games classifying the information as true or false. Organizations may identify ideologically in various ways, and may play games through time as updated evidence becomes available. Governments and companies play regulation games during disasters. Companies weigh profit against safety while the governments may subsidize, penalize, and tax. Games between nongovernmental organizations, donors, and individuals are considered.

Keywords: Game theory; pandemics; social media rumor management; disasters (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198925300016

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