PHASE TRANSITION IN A TOY MARKET

Damien Challet, Matteo Marsili () and Riccardo Zecchina ()
Additional contact information
Matteo Marsili: Istituto Nazionale per la Fisica della Materia (INFM), Trieste-SISSA Unit, V. Beirut 2-4, Trieste I-34014, Italy
Riccardo Zecchina: The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Strada Costiera 11, P.O. Box 586, I-34100 Trieste, Italy

International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance (IJTAF), 2000, vol. 03, issue 03, 451-454

Abstract: We review recent exact analytical results on Minority Game — a binary exactly solvable El Farol's bar problem. Inductive agents minimize the available information, not their losses, thus the stationary state differs from a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, the same learning dynamics leads to a Nash equilibrium when agents take into account their impact on the market.

Keywords: Minority Game; El Farol; inductive learning; Nash equilibrium; replica ansatz (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S021902490000036X
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:ijtafx:v:03:y:2000:i:03:n:s021902490000036x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S021902490000036X

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance (IJTAF) is currently edited by L P Hughston

More articles in International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance (IJTAF) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().