ASSET SPECIFICITY, AGENCY AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN OWNER-MANAGED FIRMS

Greg Shailer

Journal of Enterprising Culture (JEC), 1994, vol. 02, issue 02, 753-769

Abstract: This paper explores the application of selected contracting theory concepts to owner-managed firms. The potential advantages, the established and the substantial theoretical constructs, this area offers are considerable, and so warrant close attention by small business researchers.

Date: 1994
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DOI: 10.1142/S0218495894000240

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