THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PETROLEUM WEALTH: SOME POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Michael L. Ross ()
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Michael L. Ross: University of California, Los Angeles, USA

Middle East Development Journal (MEDJ), 2013, vol. 05, issue 02, 1-19

Abstract: Mineral wealth tends to make countries less democratic and more likely to experience a civil war. Many countries also find it hard to use their natural resource revenues to make high-quality, growth-enhancing investments. I argue that these problems are caused, in part, by the unusual qualities of resource revenues — their great size, their non-tax source, their lack of stability, and their secrecy. While there is no universal formula for changing these four qualities, I present a menu of policies that could make natural resource revenues smaller, smoother and more transparent, and hence easier for governments to invest productively.

Keywords: Oil; natural; resources; rentier state; political economy; democracy; civil war; conflict; volatility; government revenues; transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S1793812013500090

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