FUZZY ARROW'S THEOREM

John N. Mordeson () and Terry D. Clark ()
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John N. Mordeson: Department of Mathematics, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska 68178, USA
Terry D. Clark: Department of Political Science, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska 68178, USA

New Mathematics and Natural Computation (NMNC), 2009, vol. 05, issue 02, 371-383

Abstract: In this paper, we prove a fuzzy version of Arrow's Theorem that contains the crisp version. We show that under our definitions, Arrow's Theorem remains intact even if levels of intensities of the players and levels of membership in the set of alternatives are considered.

Keywords: Arrow's Theorem; fuzzy aggregation rule; fuzzy preference profile; non-dictatorial; weakly Paretian; independent of irrelevant alternatives; representation rules; veto players; oligarchies; collegiums; decisive sets; filters (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1142/S1793005709001362

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