NON-MANIPULABLE PARTITIONING

Conal Duddy, Juan Perote-Peña () and Ashley Piggins ()
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Juan Perote-Peña: Departamento de Análisis Económico, Universidad de Zaragoza, Spain

New Mathematics and Natural Computation (NMNC), 2012, vol. 08, issue 02, 273-282

Abstract: Consider the following social choice problem. A group of individuals seek to classify the elements ofXas belonging in one of two sets. The individuals may disagree as to how the elements ofXshould be classified, and so an aggregation rule is applied to determine a compromise outcome. We require that the social classification should not be imposed, nor should it be manipulable. We prove that the only aggregation rules satisfying these properties are dictatorships.

Keywords: Partitions; aggregation; non-manipulation; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1142/S1793005712400157

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