CEO Turnover, Information Uncertainty, and Debt Contracting

Saiying Deng, Vincent J. Intintoli () and Andrew Zhang ()
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Saiying Deng: Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois, USA
Vincent J. Intintoli: Clemson University, South Carolina, USA
Andrew Zhang: The University of Nevada Las Vegas, Paradise, Nevada, USA

Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), 2019, vol. 09, issue 02, 1-54

Abstract: CEO turnovers are important corporate events that can lead to significant changes within the firm. We find that CEO departures are associated with a subsequent increase in bank loan financing. The negative effect that CEO departures have on borrowing costs is largely driven by forced CEO turnovers. Following such departures, firms pay higher loan spreads, see an increase in covenants, and are more likely to be subject to collateral requirements, when compared to matched non-turnover and voluntary turnover firms. Evidence suggests that asset substitution and changes in accounting information quality help to explain the observed worsened terms following forced dismissals. On the other hand, more traditional voluntary departures are unrelated to changes in price and non-price loan terms.

Keywords: CEO turnover; bank loan terms; agency cost of debt; information uncertainty; forced turnover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S2010139219500010

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