When Do Governance Mechanisms Matter Most?

Derek Horstmeyer and Kara Wells ()
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Derek Horstmeyer: School of Business, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030, United States
Kara Wells: Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, 6214 Bishop Blvd, Dallas, TX 75275, United States

Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), 2020, vol. 10, issue 01, 1-52

Abstract: We examine the interaction of internal and external firm-level governance mechanisms with industry-specific economic conditions to assess when they best serve current shareholders. We find that external governance (shareholder rights) is most valuable during industry upturns, with no differential benefit during downturns. For internal governance, we find that small boards are incrementally more valuable during upturns but that this result weakens/reverses during downturns, and there is inconclusive evidence regarding the state dependent value of institutional ownership. Contributions include showing: governance mechanisms have industry economic state dependent values; small boards may not always be optimal; and managers do not capture these inefficiencies through aggressive policy decisions, nor excessive compensation.

Keywords: Corporate governance; board of directors; institutional ownership; shareholder rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1142/S2010139220500032

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