EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Passive Institutions and Long-Run CEO Compensation: Evidence from Proxy Voting

In Ji Jang ()
Additional contact information
In Ji Jang: Department of Finance, Bentley University, 175 Forest Street, Waltham, MA 02452-4705, USA

Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), 2024, vol. 14, issue 03, 1-64

Abstract: A one-standard-deviation increase in passive ownership leads to a 25% increase in the compensation duration. I find proxy voting is the channel through which passive investors affect incentive horizons. Since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, passive funds tend to vote more against Say-on-Pay (SOP) proposals, and SOP proposals are less likely to pass with higher passive ownership. Moreover, passive ownership is associated with a greater number of shareholder-sponsored compensation proposals and an increased likelihood of these proposals passing. The overall findings indicate that passive institutions work to lengthen CEO compensation to align incentive horizons, and proxy voting is the mechanism through which they exert influence.

Keywords: Passive funds; incentive horizons; proxy voting; institutional investors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G23 G32 G34 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S2010139224500083
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:qjfxxx:v:14:y:2024:i:03:n:s2010139224500083

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S2010139224500083

Access Statistics for this article

Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF) is currently edited by Fernando Zapatero

More articles in Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:wsi:qjfxxx:v:14:y:2024:i:03:n:s2010139224500083