SUBJECT MATCHING: A CASE STUDY ON TWO-SIDED MATCHING
Xiaolin Xing () and
Yunhua Liu
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Xiaolin Xing: Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, Singapore 119260, Singapore
Yunhua Liu: Division of Economics, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
The Singapore Economic Review (SER), 2005, vol. 50, issue 02, 155-168
Abstract:
This paper investigates subject matching in the National University of Singapore (NUS). The matching process is conducted in a primary market and a secondary market. In the primary market, students and departments are matched by a centralized matching procedure, based on their submitted preferences. Students who are not satisfied with their allocations in the primary market can choose to join the secondary market. By comparing matching results in these two markets, we show how a centralized matching procedure and a decentralized matching procedure can work together to produce a desirable outcome, especially in a many-to-many matching market.
Keywords: Two-sided matching; centralized matching; decentralized matching; subject selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1142/S0217590805001949
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