CONFLICTS AND DELAYS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

Jung Hur

The Singapore Economic Review (SER), 2012, vol. 57, issue 02, 1-20

Abstract: Motivated by the current delay in WTO negotiations, we consider a model of a bilateral trade agreement in the presence of asymmetric cross-border externalities. In this model, we show that both countries conflict in their preferred set of policy agendas and thus have incentives to delay their negotiations. We also find that the extent of delay depends on the level of transfer between them. These results imply an importance of bilateral compensation scheme between developing and developed countries in the current WTO negotiations so as to reduce the delays.

Keywords: International trade agreement; negative externality; a war of attrition; delay; F13; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0217590812500105
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:serxxx:v:57:y:2012:i:02:n:s0217590812500105

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0217590812500105

Access Statistics for this article

The Singapore Economic Review (SER) is currently edited by Euston Quah

More articles in The Singapore Economic Review (SER) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().