NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ON SOCIAL NETWORKS WITH INDIRECT CONNECTIONS AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Qing-Jun Li and Hai-Hua Hu
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Qing-Jun Li: School of Economics and Management, Weifang University, No. 5147, Dongfeng East Street, Weifang, Shandong 261061, P. R. China
Hai-Hua Hu: ��School of Management, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710055, P. R. China

The Singapore Economic Review (SER), 2024, vol. 69, issue 08, 2581-2596

Abstract: This study aims to investigate how various forms of social control, namely selective incentive and behavioral conformity, collectively rationalize participation in collective action, through indirect network connections. To address it, we use a public game model and analyze the equilibrium conditions of the emergence of collective action on centralized, star-shaped networks and on decentralized, loop-shaped networks. The results show that social control is effective in motivating contribution towards a public good; however, the effect is highly dependent on the ratio of the benefits derived from selective incentive versus behavioral conformity as well as on the structure of social networks. Moreover, we find that indirect network connections can be an important route through which social control can improve the emergence of collective action. These findings have important implications for collective action theory and for intervention in collective actions.

Keywords: Collective action; social networks; social control; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C68 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1142/S021759082150003X

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