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Modified Shapley-Shubik power index for parliamentary coalitions

Mariusz Mazurkiewicz () and Jacek Mercik

Operations Research and Decisions, 2005, vol. 15, issue 2, 43-52

Abstract: Classical power analysis does not involve preferences of players (parties). Classical power indices are constructed under assumption of equal probability of occurrence for each coalition. The paper contains a proposition of relaxation of this assumption, based on extended Shapley–Shubik power index approach.

Keywords: power index; ideological preferences; ideological distance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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