Large population evolutionary games played within a life history framework

David Ramsey ()

Operations Research and Decisions, 2009, vol. 19, issue 2, 51-74

Abstract: In many evolutionary games, such as parental care games, the length of time spent playing a realisation of the game is dependent on the strategy of an individual. Also, the payoff of a deserting male cannot be defined in isolation from the strategies used in the population as a whole. Such games should be defined as games against the field (large population games) rather than two-player games. Several examples are presented to illustrate the theory of such games against the field

Keywords: evolutionary game theory; game against the field; phase; evolutionarily stable strategy; neighbourhood invasion strategy; polymorphism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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