Indirect control and power

Cesarino Bertini (), Jacek Mercik and Izabella Stach ()

Operations Research and Decisions, 2016, vol. 26, issue 2, 7-30

Abstract: To determine who has the power within a stock corporate company can be a quite complex problem, especially when control is achieved through alliances between shareholders. This problem arises especially in cases of indirect control of corporations, that is, in situations involving shareholders and companies with cross-shareholdings. The first to solve the problem of measuring power in the case of indirect share control were Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen in [10]. In the following years, numerous other models were introduced. In this paper, we critically examine the models of: Gambarelli and Owen, Denti and Prati, Crama and Leruth, Karos and Peters, as well as Mercik and Lobos, taking into account two well-known, illustrative examples, one with an acyclic corporate structure and the other with a cyclic structure.

Keywords: game theory; indirect control; corporations; power indice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wut:journl:v:2:y:2016:p:7-30:id:1228

DOI: 10.5277/ord160202

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