Quantitative evaluation of veto power

Michela Chessa and Vito Fragnelli ()

Operations Research and Decisions, 2011, vol. 21, issue 3-4, 5-19

Abstract: The decisiveness index and the loose protectionism index for a single player have been intro- duced, starting from the decisiveness and the loose protectionism indices for a collective decision- making mechanism defined by Carreras. Attention was mainly focused on the latter index, being pro- posed as a quantitative measure of the power of veto of each agent. According to this index, a veto player has veto power equal to one, while each other player has a fractional power according to her/his likelihood of blocking a given proposal. Such an index coincides with the expected payoff at the Bayesian equilibrium of a suitable Bayesian game, which illustrates the non-cooperative point of view of a decision-making mechanism.

Keywords: veto power; indices; quantitative measure; Bayesian game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wut:journl:v:3-4:y:2011:p:5-19:id:1012

DOI: 10.5277/ord1203-0401

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