A compensation-based pricing scheme in markets with non-convexities

Izabela Żółtowska () and Eugeniusz Toczyłowski

Operations Research and Decisions, 2009, vol. 19, issue 4, 125-140

Abstract: A compensation-based pricing scheme is a market clearing mechanism that may be applied when a uniform, linear pricing scheme cannot support equilibrium allocations in the auction markets. We analyze extensions of our previously proposed pricing scheme [14] to include various possible representations of bids that reflect some non-convex costs and constraints. We conclude with a discussion on directions for future research.

Keywords: auction design; electricity market; non-convex bids; minimum profit condition; unit commitment constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wut:journl:v:4:y:2009:p:125-140:id:150

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