Fire Sales, the LOLR, and Bank Runs with Continuous Asset Liquidity
Edoardo Lanari ()
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Edoardo Lanari: YPFS, Yale School of Management, https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/
Journal of Financial Crises, 2022, vol. 4, issue 4, 77-102
Banks' asset fire sales and recourse to central bank credit are modeled with continuous asset liquidity, allowing us to derive the liability structure of a bank. Both asset sales liquidity and the central bank collateral framework are modeled as power functions within the unit interval. Funding stability is captured as a strategic bank run game in pure strategies between depositors. Fire sale liquidity and the central bank collateral framework determine jointly the ability of the banking system to deliver maturity transformation without endangering financial stability. The model also explains why banks tend to use the least liquid eligible collateral with the central bank and why a sudden unanticipated reduction of asset liquidity, or a tightening of the collateral framework, can trigger a bank run. The model also shows that the collateral framework can be understood, beyond its aim to protect the central bank, as a financial stability and unconventional monetary policy instrument.
Keywords: asset liquidity; bank intermediation spreads; bank run; capital structure; collateral; fire sales; lender of last resort (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:ypfsfc:v:4:y:2022:i:4:p:77-102
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