Theoretical Base of Monetary Policy Transparency

Borivoje D. Kruskovic
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Borivoje D. Kruskovic: N.A.

Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business, 2011, vol. 14, issue 1, 59-71

Abstract: Transparency is most often defined as the absence of asymmetrical information between financial markets and monetary policy makers. There are different views on the central bank transparency (Assuring, Exacting, Irrelevance, Conditional, Disturbing and Diverting view). The examination of the central bank transparency is actually the examination of the effects of inflation targeting.

Date: 2011
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