Searching for the EU Social Dialogue Model

Richard Freeman

Chapter 11 in Social Pacts, Employment and Growth. A Reappraisal of Ezio Tarantelli’s Thought, 2007, pp 221-238 from AIEL - Associazione Italiana Economisti del Lavoro

Abstract: The chapter acknowledges the lack of a theory of social dialogue. In spite of this weakness, the author argues that efficient bargaining/Coase theorem can be a valuable ideal for analyzing social dialogue systems like most EU economies, compared to the perfectly functioning competitive model used to benchmark market-driven economies, even though the world does not evidence efficient bargaining as a general rule. The author also underlines the virtue of a research program tending to design factors that lead parties to efficient solutions, not only on the assumption of rational strategic behaviour but also on potentially more realistic assumptions about how people take their decisions.

Keywords: Theory of social dialogue; efficient bargaining; Coase theorem. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J52 J53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Chapter: Searching for the EU Social Dialogue Model (2007)
Working Paper: Searching for the EU Social Dialogue Model (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ail:chapts:02-11

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